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Supervising mandatory pension funds:  
Issues and challenges 
 
Gustavo Demarco and Rafael Rofman,  
with contributions from Edward Whitehouse 
 
 
The regulation and supervision of pension funds is a critical part of 
building public confidence in a funded-pension system.  This paper 
argues that confidence is best bolstered by an independent, 
autonomous and transparent supervision agency, particularly when 
previous systems had failed.   The choice between proactive and 
reactive supervision depends on previous experience of self-
regulation in a country’s financial sector.   
 
The paper examines four key areas of supervision in detail: 
institutional, financial, membership and benefits control.  It looks 
at collection of contributions, asset valuation, portfolio limits, 
custodianship and benefit guarantees.  New data are presented on 
the performance of supervision agencies in and on marketing and 
operation costs of new pension funds in Latin America.  
Comparative data for OECD countries also included.     
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Supervising mandatory funded pension systems:  
Issues and challenges 
Gustavo Demarco and Rafael Rofman, 
with contributions from Edward Whitehouse1 
 
1.  Introduction 
 This paper looks at general issues in designing the supervisory framework for a 
mandatory defined-contribution pension system.  Many countries have introduced such 
a system and others are seriously considering reform.  Although much has been written 
about issues such as the transition to a funded system and the design of benefits, very 
little has been said on the crucial issue of regulating pension funds.  Yet, regulation and 
supervision are crucial to the success of reforms.   
Although influenced by the experience of the authors in the supervision agency 
in Argentina, the paper aims to come to general conclusions relevant to other countries 
embarking on fundamental pension reforms. The authors also draw on their experience 
of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hungary, Peru and Uruguay.  Data from OECD 
countries are also included.     
                                            
1  Manager of control operations, Superintendencia de Administrados de Fondos de Jubilaciones y 
Pensiones, Argentina; head of the analysis and research unit, Nacion AFJP, Argentina; and Director, Axia 
Economics, United Kingdom, respectively.  Demarco and Rofman prepared the bulk of the paper.  
Whitehouse was responsible for editing and the sections relating to OECD countries.  We are grateful to 
Robert Palacios and participants at a World Bank seminar on 15 January 1998 for comments.  The paper is 
part of the World bank Pension Reform Primer: see http://www.worldbank.org/pensions for details.  It 
expresses a personal view, which may not reflect the views of organisations with which we are associated.   
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 The focus of the paper is on establishing an efficient and effective supervision 
agency.  Some discussion of regulation is also unavoidable, since reasonable regulations 
are a necessary condition for appropriate supervision.   
There is no unique, optimal supervision system.  Countries may choose 
particular models, and what seems desirable in abstract may prove impossible in the 
context of actual policy design.  Second-best solutions usually result.    
 The following section discusses possible approaches to pension-fund supervision 
and the factors should be taken into account when designing the system of control.  The 
third section looks at specific issues in the organisation of a supervisory agency, while 
the fourth section describes the areas of the pension system where supervision should 
be concentrated.  The fifth section concludes. 
  
2.  The conceptual approach to supervision 
 Central banks, tax-collection authorities and capital-market regulators, such as 
securities and exchange commissions already carry out most of the activities of a 
pension supervision agency.  Some analysts, such as Shah (1996), have argued that 
specialist managing companies reduce the overall efficiency of the pension system and 
that a separate supervisory agency is unnecessary. 
 On the other hand, participation in the reformed pension system is often 
mandatory (at least for part of the population), unlike other forms of savings.  The state 
therefore has a responsibility to ensure that fund management meets some basic rules 
and is carefully supervised, at least in the first years of the new system (Vittas, 1998). 
 A second argument for a specialised supervisory agency is the unique 
combination in pension systems of capital markets, insurance and social security.  In 
many reforming countries, there is no prior experience of regulating a system with such 
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complex interactions.  At the minimum, some formalised degree of co-ordination 
between different agencies would be necessary.   
 A third argument is that some of the products in the new pension system, such as 
life and retirement insurance are new, or they were under-regulated or even 
unregulated in the past.  Public pensions were often also unsupervised, with the 
assumption that standard government audit procedures would suffice.  But this has 
proved wrong in many cases, as systems went bankrupt or came close to bankruptcy.  
 A fourth practical reason is that people are often suspicious of the transparency 
and efficiency of pre-existing supervisory agencies.  Reforms received electoral support 
because they promised radical changes in pension systems, and ‘cultural’ vices of some 
regulatory agencies are linked in voters’ minds with previous failures. 
 Mandatory multipillar schemes are expected to perform better than traditional 
pay-as-you-go models, partly because their designers believe that supervision from 
both authorities and fund members will be more efficient.  Nevertheless, these schemes 
are not immune from risks, even in the absence of wrongdoing.  These risks have some 
similarities with those in a pay-as-you-go scheme (McGillivray, 1997).  The government, 
which forces workers to contribute and aims to ensure a minimum level of welfare to all 
members of society, must therefore try to reduce such risks.  Easy-to-understand 
regulations and an efficient, effective supervision agency are a vital part of controlling 
such risks.   
 The main choice in designing the supervisory system is between proactive and 
reactive models.  The first approach involves detailed regulation of most activities of 
pension-fund managers.  Supervisory and auditing activities must be detailed and well 
defined.  The aim is to prevent possible wrongdoing.  The second approach relies on 
self-regulation, with much less detailed instructions from supervisors.  Pension fund 
managers are assumed to have the right incentives for adequate self-regulation.  The 
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state needs only to intervene in the few cases when these incentives fail.  In the reactive 
model, sanctions and penalties for violating the system’s rules need to be very heavy. 
 The case for proactive models of supervision for newly-created pension funds in 
less-developed countries is quite strong.  Such countries have little tradition of 
regulatory enforcement and a poor reliability record in the financial sector.  Countries 
with longer and broader experience of self-regulation of financial institutions should 
consider a more reactive model. 
The choice between proactive and reactive depends crucially on the national 
context.  However, a combined approach can be the worst choice: for example, a 
reactive model in a country with light or rarely enforced penalties will probably end in 
crisis. 
 
3.  The organisation of the supervisory agency 
3.1  Regulation or supervision? 
Although regulation (i.e., setting the rules) and supervision (i.e., enforcing the 
rules) of pension funds are distinct functions, they could be assigned to the same 
institution, or clearly assigned to different institutions.  Using a single institution has 
the advantage of defining control routines regardless of the personal preferences of 
regulators.  The second allows supervisors to approach their job without 
preconceptions.   
A combination of both alternatives is possible.  This corresponds more closely to 
the experience of countries that have introduced private pension funds.  In most 
countries a ‘superintendency of pension funds’ was created, while the regulatory 
framework was defined partly by this agency, and partly by other authorities, such as 
finance and labour ministries, the social-security administration, and regulators of other 
financial services.    
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3.2  Organisational structure 
The supervision agency’s tasks consist of four main areas, which are discussed in 
the following section: control of institutional structure, finances, membership and 
pension benefits.  
Another potential supervision area is enforcing payment of pension 
contributions.  The strategy for enforcement will depend on the collection system.  If 
contributions are collected directly by private pension funds, as in Chile, the funds must 
play a role in controlling evasion.  But if contributions are collected centrally, as in 
Argentina, the collection agency must develop programs to control evasion.  Many 
countries have chosen centralised collection, so the control of evasion will constitute an 
important area of supervision.   
 The organisational structure of the supervisory agency must take account of its 
legal role. While details will depend on the peculiarities of each system, some basic 
elements are universally relevant.   
 Accountability and effective supervision suggest that a single director, with full 
powers to apply regulations and issue new ones, should head the agency.  An advisory 
board can be useful, but only if it does not limit the decision-making ability of the 
director.  The division responsible for the control of pension-fund activities should have 
at least four departments, dealing with institutional issues (such as licensing and book 
keeping), financial issues (investment limits, returns, guarantees), membership (joining 
funds, transfers, claims) and benefits (calculation of annuities, disability and survivors 
benefits).  Another division should cover statistical and research, with facilities for 
issuing publications.  A third division should handle legal affairs, including a 
department responsible of handling sanctions and another for legal advice (including 
normative advice and complaints).  Finally, a support services division should handle 
information technology, administration and human resources.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
proposed structure. 
 9
 
Figure 1.  Organisation of the supervisory agency  
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3.3  Status of the director of the supervisory agency  
 The authority of the supervisory agency must be shielded from political 
pressures.  Although this is true of most regulatory functions of the state, the primary 
aim of pension supervision must always be to protect the long-term stability and 
security of members’ funds.  Low-level regulations could have a significant effect on the 
investment of billions of dollars, which will necessarily expose the supervisory agency 
to lobbying.  To avoid (or, at least, minimise) them, the agency should be autonomous 
and independent of government ministries.  The director should preferably be 
appointed through a transparent process, probably with participation of parliament or 
congress, and serve for a fixed period.   
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3.4  Budget 
 Two approaches to financing the agency are possible.  Expenses could come from 
general government revenues (as in Chile) or pension fund management companies 
could be required to pay a supervision fee (as in Argentina).  The second choice is more 
appealing, since it avoids cross-subsidies to scheme members when not all the 
population participates in the system.  In addition, if the supervisory agency has the 
power to collect its own fees, it can reduce political pressure from other areas of 
government.   
In Argentina, the supervisory agency sets out an annual budget within the pre-
specified limit of 1.5 per cent of system revenue.  The agency then spends as necessity 
dictates and requires transfers from the managing companies monthly, covering the 
expenses of the previous month.  This gives the agency room for manoeuvre as 
necessary.  At the same time, there is no incentive to overspend (as there might be if 
fees exceeded regular expenses).  Budgeted supervision expenses have been below 0.5 
per cent of system revenue and actual expenses have been around 60 per cent of the 
budget.  
 
3.5  Staff 
 Staffing the supervision agency may be a challenging task when the new pension 
system is introduced.  Professionals with relevant experience will probably be highly 
specialised and scarce.  The supervisory agency will therefore need to develop an 
intensive training programme to ensure a supply of capable staff.   
 The agency will of course be competing with the pension-fund managing 
companies to hire a relatively few trained professionals and to train others with the 
right aptitude.  To attract and retain a qualified workforce, the supervision agency must 
offer competitive wages and benefits (such as holidays, health insurance, bonuses etc.).  
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In many countries, this may be superior to the packages offered to other government 
officials.  This is probably unavoidable.  It can either be achieved implicitly (i.e., through 
hidden benefits) or explicitly (with higher wages).  In Argentina, the pension law 
requires that supervision employees receive a salary greater than or equal to that of the 
average paid by the 50 per cent of pension-fund management companies with the 
highest wages. 
 A second issue is the agency’s human-resources policy.  In many countries, 
hiring and firing government employees is a complex, bureaucratic process.  The need 
for flexibility means that the supervision agency should operate more as a private 
company, hiring and firing employees as allowed in the law.  This is easiest if the 
agency is financially autonomous. 
 In most of the countries where new funded systems have been introduced, the 
supervision agency has been staffed with many civil servants seconded from other 
areas of government.  Employees with expertise in other areas, for example, from the 
central bank, public pension system or insurance regulator can be recruited.  
Nevertheless, existing agencies and departments will often use secondment as a way of 
transferring less skilled or motivated employees.  Officials of the new agency need to be 
flexible and dynamic to adapt to a new activity.  Professionals new to government 
should be recruited alongside civil-service secondees.   
 
3.6  Practical experience 
 The normative guidelines presented above showed how the supervision should 
be organised.  Here we draw on the experience of several countries that have funded 
pension systems.  Seven countries in Latin America — Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay — now have fully functional systems.  Others 
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have begun designing reforms (Venezuela, Brazil) and others are implementing them 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador).  
 Comparing the performance of Latin American agencies with other regions is not 
easy, since their design is quite different.  First, Latin American regimes tend to be 
proactive, while others are more reactive.  For example, Charpentier (1997) reports that 
the United States Department of Labor reviews just one per cent of pension-related 
documents each year.  Secondly, Latin American agencies are uniquely devoted to 
pension funds, whereas in OECD countries, supervision of funds tends to be part of a 
larger organisation (see Table 2).  One of the main reasons for these different 
approaches is historical: privately managed pension schemes had existed for some time 
before the supervisory agency was created in developed countries.  Therefore, the 
supervision structure had to be adapted to the shape of the pensions industry.  In 
contrast, Latin American pension funds were created after or, in some cases, at the same 
time as supervision agencies, giving more time to develop the regulatory and 
supervisory infrastructure.  Although Austria, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom and United States have comprehensive pension laws as in Latin America, in 
other OECD countries, regulations are found across a range of legal provisions.2    
 The new Latin-American supervisory agencies, although set up in similar 
contexts, are organised in quite different ways.  In three of the seven countries with 
fully implemented reforms, the supervisory agency is part of the ministry of the 
economy or the treasury (Table 1).  In two countries, the agency is part of the ministry 
of labour and social security.  In the remaining two countries, it is part of the central 
bank. 
 There are also significant differences in financing and the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by the agency.  The supervision agency has a significant degree of autonomy —
                                            
2  Laboul (1997), p. 58.   
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both in terms of administrative and political status — in three countries.  These three 
agencies are financed directly by supervised pension companies, through the payment 
of a fee.  At the other extreme, the agencies in Colombia and Uruguay are a department 
of the central bank.  Chile is a halfway house, since the supervisory agency is separate 
but with (administrative, political and financial) dependence on the ministry of labour 
and social security. 
 
Table 1. Institutional characteristics of pension-fund  
supervisory agencies in Latin America 
Country Area of government Administrative and Funding source
Argentina Ministry of labour and social security Autonomous Supervision fee
Bolivia Treasury Dependent Supervision fee 
Chile Ministry of labour and social security Dependent National budget 
Colombia Central bank Dependent Supervision fee 
Mexico Secretary of treasury Autonomous Supervision fee (partial) 
Peru Ministry of economy Autonomous Supervision fee 
Uruguay Central bank Dependent National budget 
Source: based on Bertín and Perrotto (1997) 
 Table 2 shows the situation in OECD countries.  Pension-fund supervision is 
usually the responsibility of a separate agency, although Ministries are directly 
involved in Austria, Finland, Greece, Japan, Spain and the United States (first column).  
In 17 countries, the supervision of pension funds is part of the supervision of other 
insurance markets (second column).  Pensions and insurance have a number of common 
characteristics, such as similar organisation and operation.  Insurance companies have a 
major role in the pension sector in many countries, managing 20-30 per cent of total 
pension assets across the OECD.  They often offer group-insurance plans and act as 
investment and benefit managers.   
The agency responsible for pension-fund supervision also sets regulations in 
fourteen countries (third column).  The penultimate column shows the predominant 
plan type in a country.  These can be either defined benefit (where the pension value 
depends on some measure of earnings and years of contributions) or defined 
contribution (where the pension depends on the value of accumulated contributions 
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and investment returns).  The final column gives a rough indication of the size of the 
private pension sector in the country.   
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Table 2.  Supervisory authorities in OECD countries 
Country Supervision Insurance Regulation Main plan type Coverage 
Australia Insurance and superannuation commission same same DC high 
Austria Ministry of finance same same   
Belgium Insurance supervisory office same Ministry of economic affairs/ 
same  
DB medium 
Canada Office of superintendent of financial 
institutions 
same same DB medium 
Czech Republic Department of supplementary pensions 
and insurance, ministry of finance 
Insurance supervisory 
authority 
Ministry of finance DC  
Denmark Financial supervisory authority same same DC high 
Finland Ministry of social affairs and health same same DB  
France Pension funds control commission Insurance control 
commission 
Ministry of finance/ 
social affairs 
DB high 
Germany Federal insurance supervisory office same Ministry of finance DB medium 
Greece Ministry of development same same  low 
Hungary State private funds supervision Insurance supervisory 
authority 
Ministry of finance DC medium 
Iceland Banking supervisory authority Insurance supervisory 
authority 
Ministry of finance DC  
Ireland Pension board  Irish insurance federation Ministry of enterprise and 
employment 
DB medium 
Italy  Supervisory committee for pension funds ISVAP same DB low 
Japan Ministry of health and welfare/finance Ministry of finance same DB medium 
Korea Financial services commission same Ministry of finance and 
economy 
  
Luxembourg Insurance commissioner’s office same same  medium 
Netherlands Insurance supervisory body same Ministry of social affairs and 
employment 
DB high 
Norway Banking, Insurance and Securities 
Commission 
same Ministries of finance/health and 
social affairs/same 
 medium 
Portugal Insurance Institute same same  low 
Spain Ministry of finance same same  low 
Sweden Financial supervisory authority same same  high 
Switzerland Federal office of social insurance/federal 
office of supervision of private insurance 
same Federal ministries  high 
United Kingdom Financial services authority and 
occupational pensions regulatory authority
same (financial services 
authority) 
Departments of trade and 
industry/social security  
DB/DC medium 
United States Department of labor (Pension and welfare 
benefits administration) 
Department of commerce 
and National association of 
insurance commissioners 
same DB/DC medium 
Source: Laboul (1998), Tables 4 and 13; Turner and Watanabe (1996); Palacios and Whitehouse (1998)  
Note: Under ‘Insurance’, ‘same’ indicates that same organisation is responsible for supervising both pension funds and other insurance and, 
under ‘Regulation’, that same body covers supervision and regulation of pension funds.  Under ‘Main plan type’, ‘DB’ is defined benefit and ‘DC’ is 
defined contribution. Coverage: ‘high’ is greater than 75 per cent, low is less than 25 per cent.  Canada: the provinces also have pension 
superintendents, commissions etc. France: the insurance control commission and the control commission for welfare and mutual associations have 
representatives on pension-funds control commission.  Germany: coverage is about 90 per cent in the west.  Italy: the plans shown are funded 
schemes, generally limited to a small number of senior executives.  Korea: recently introduced a unified supervisory authority.  Mexico: although an 
OECD member is included in Table 1 with other Latin-American countries.  Poland: reforms under discussion.  Switzerland: coverage universal 
above income floor (SFr 23,280).  United Kingdom: coverage 45 per cent by employer DB plans, 2 per cent employer DC and 28 per cent in 
individual DC accounts (‘personal pensions’).  United States: coverage divides evenly between DB and DC schemes.   
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3.7 Performance of supervisory agencies in Latin America 
 Comparing the performance of Latin American agencies is complex, due to the 
different characteristics of national systems.  Table 3 presents a few indicators.  The 
Mexican is the largest of the seven agencies in terms of number of employees.  But this 
reflects the fact that over 11 million employees are covered in Mexico, compared with 
about 6 million in Chile and Argentina, 2½ million in Colombia, just over 1 million in 
Peru and fewer than half a million in Bolivia and Uruguay.  Consequently, Mexico’s 
employee-to-fund-member ratio is the second lowest, after Colombia. The very high 
ratios in Bolivia and Uruguay probably result from the relative youth of their systems 
and the small number of pension-fund members, which may cause problems due to lack 
of scale.  In contrast, the high ratio in Peru may indicate inefficiency. 
 Comparisons of ratios to the value of the fund are dominated by the relative 
maturity of the systems: funds in Chile are nearly twice as large as all other countries 
put together.  The ratio of the budget to the revenues flowing into funds is less 
distorted.  This measure shows how much of workers’ contributions go to finance 
supervision (in systems where fees pay for supervision).  Because the supervision 
agencies in Colombia and Uruguay are part of the central bank, it is unfortunately not 
possible to isolate their budgets from that of the parent institution.  On this measure, 
the cheapest agencies are those in Chile and Argentina, which spend between a quarter 
and a half of one per cent of total revenues.  The ratio of employees to the number of 
operating pension funds appears to be the most consistent indicator.  Its value is close 
to 10 in most cases.  The exceptions of Colombia and Uruguay reflect the fact that 
supervision is part of the central bank, and so support services are part of the larger 
organisation and outside the supervision agency.   
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Table 3.  Performance indicators of pension supervision agencies 
in Latin-American Countries 
Country Employees In direct 
control areas 
Budget Employees/ 
fund members
Employees/
funds 
Budget/ 
funds’ assets 
Budget/ 
fund revenue
 number % $million per million number % % 
Argentina 183 43 12.5 30.5 10.2 0.14 0.36 
Bolivia 21 43 1.9 63.9 10.5 1.80 1.80 
Chile 134 69 7.0 23.2 10.1 0.02 0.28 
Colombia 30 73 —  11.9 3.3 — — 
Mexico 214 25 26.3 19.1 12.6 0.42 0.95 
Peru 85 19 5.1 73.9 14.2 0.34 1.23 
Uruguay 21 81 — 45.7 4.2 — — 
Source: authors’ calculations based on information obtained from supervision agencies 
Note: Bolivia: budget/funds and budget/revenue are equal because the figures cover only one year of 
operation.  The figures exclude the Bonosol/Bolivida programme  
 
 
4.  Areas of supervision  
4.1 Introduction 
 We have divided the regulatory activities of the agency into four main areas.  
The discussion in this section covers each in turn.     
• Institutional control covers the functioning of the pension-fund management 
companies, from its authorisation and licensing to its eventual dissolution, by 
merger or liquidation.  This area also includes vetting managing-company officials 
and sales forces and branch registration.  
• Financial control supervises contribution-collection and investment procedures of 
the private pension funds  
• Membership control looks at the enrolment process, transfers and compliance.  This 
area also needs a strong, efficient member complaints department. 
• Benefits control requires monitoring of benefit calculations and disability and 
survivors insurance, if these are part of the reformed system.  
 An efficient supervisory agency should concentrate its efforts on these problems, 
giving maximum priority to its front-line work.  We will concentrate on this substantive 
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work, although support areas, such as information technology, human resources and 
legal advice are, of course, important. 
 
4.2 Institutional control 
This area is particularly important in the initial years of the system of private 
pension funds.  In subsequent years, its importance to supervision scheme will decline 
for a number of reasons.  First, the large initial effort in licensing new pension fund 
companies will naturally diminish.  Secondly, uncertainty is greater when the new 
system is introduced.  Some pension funds may fail to obtain their projected rates of 
return.  Thirdly, pension-fund mergers or eventual liquidation will be more widespread 
initially, until the market stabilises.  Fourthly, as pension funds become more familiar 
with the regulations, control can become more selective.  Finally, as the number and 
value of benefit payments increase as the scheme matures, the third area of control 
becomes relatively more important.   
Eight key activities are covered in this section: 
• Licensing new pension funds 
• Merger and liquidation of funds 
• Fund marketing 
• Fund advertising  
• Disclosure 
• Evaluation of financial and operational performance 
• Collecting institutional information 
• Inspections and audits 
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4.2.1 Licensing pension funds 
The licensing procedure will be of crucial importance when the new system is 
introduced.  It should include 
• Scrutiny of the feasibility of pension-fund managers’ investment projects 
• Enforcing legal requirements, such as the constitution of an entity whose principal 
or sole objective is pension-fund administration 
• Enforcing financial requirements, such minimum reserves and capital.  Note that the 
capital of the fund-management company is separated from the pension fund itself.  
This distinguishes pension funds from other financial institutions, such as banks.  
 
4.2.2 Merger and liquidation 
The first years of operation are likely to be unstable, until experience of the new 
market is gained and equilibrium is reached.  So, although rare in a mature system, 
merger and liquidation may be regular at the beginning.   
 In Argentina, seven of the 25 funds authorised have disappeared through merger 
in the first three years of the new regime.  This was a consequence of financial deficits in 
funds that failed to obtain the market share they anticipated.  Some of the remaining 18 
funds are still operating below their break-even points.  A small number of mergers 
could still take place in the next few years.  The precise regulation of the merger 
processes and timing and effective supervision of these regulations meant there were 
practically no costs to affiliates, who were simply transferred from the old to the new 
funds.3 
                                            
3  This provides another practical argument for separation of assets between the pension fund and its 
administrator. 
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In both Chile and Argentina, the supervision agency acts as liquidator of the 
pension fund.  There have been no bankruptcies in Argentina, but three in Chile.  
Liquidation involves two processes: the liquidation of the fund-management company 
and the transfer of the pension fund to one or more other administrators.  It can be 
useful to treat these two processes separately.  In two of the Chilean cases, the 
Supervision agency acted as liquidator of the pension fund and the fund-management 
company as well, whereas in the third case, an external liquidator was designated by 
the courts according to normal commercial law.  The latter allows the supervision 
agency to concentrate on the fund’s problems rather than those of its managers. 
 
4.2.3 Marketing 
Marketing regulations can have a significant impact on the level of 
administrative costs.  Most Latin-American countries that adopted private pension 
funds show very high intermediation costs.  Much of this is due to the size of marketing 
expenses.  High marketing expenses, as well as increasing overall charges can also 
reduce the efficiency and transparency of the whole system. 
High intermediation costs may result from 
• excessive spending to improve market share 
• a too permissive regime on switching from one pension fund to another 
• necessary expenses of intermediaries or promoters 
• independence (and sometimes divergence) of objectives between sales forces and 
fund managers 
 Table 4 looks at the cost structure in Argentina and Chile.  For ease of 
comparison, the information refers to the first three years of operation — 1981-83 for 
Chile and 1994-97 for Argentina — along with the latest data, 1996, for Chile.  In Chile 
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the number of affiliates per fund employee increased very slowly over the first years of 
operation, whereas in Argentina it fell in the third year after an increase in the second.  
This reflects the difficulty funds encounter in reducing the size of the sales force after 
the enormous initial affiliation process.  By 1996, the funds’ labour force was almost six 
times larger than in the first few years of the system. 
 Analysis of the structure of funds’ costs shows a continuous increase in the 
importance of marketing in Argentina, whereas marketing’s share of total costs fell in 
Chile in the first few years, but recovered strongly later on.  Setting aside differences in 
data collection, this reflects the effect of a significant reduction in non-salary marketing 
costs in Chile during the first few years, and a significant increase in remuneration of 
the sales force in recent years.  
While Peru limited the number of transfers directly, Argentina has followed an 
indirect route, maintaining the number of possible transfers.  This new regulatory 
strategy puts the main responsibility for transfers on branches of the fund-management 
company rather than on the sales force.  Preliminary statistics reveal a one third fall in 
monthly transfers.  This might reduce costs. 
 
Table 4.  Marketing-costs indicators, Argentina and Chile 
 Argentina Chile 
Years of operation 1 2 3 1 2 3 16
Pension-fund employees  14,094 18,588 22,749 4,101 3,753 4,932 23,798
Fund members/employees 285 328 309 351 398 409 234
Marketing/total costs (%) 31 41 50 33 24 23 48
Employee costs/ 
marketing costs (%) 
71 68 66 47 65 61 89
Source: SAFJP, Argentina; SAFP, Chile 
Note: 1995-97 for Argentina, 1981-83 and 1996 for Chile 
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4.2.4 Advertising 
 Rules for advertising are especially important in the early years after reform.  
The population needs to be informed about the new system.  However, the mass media 
can misinform, or induce potential members to make their choice based on incorrect 
information. 
 Fund-management companies should be obliged to send every advertisement to 
the supervision agency.  The agency should have the powers to reject them or require 
revisions. Controls need not be exhaustive, and as time passes, they can gradually 
become more selective.  
 It is important to establish the power to reject advertising clearly in law or 
regulations: the supervision agency should not act as a censor of public information. In 
Argentina, general restrictions cover 
• providing  information that could cause members to make errors (i.e., projection of 
benefits based on extremely optimistic assumptions, identifying the fund-
management company with partner firms) 
• selecting, omitting or manipulating information to show that the pension fund is in a 
better position than it really is 
• cross-selling, i.e. forcing individual choice by linking fund membership with non-
pension products (such as loans, credit cards, etc.) 
 
4.2.5 Inspections and audits 
 Inspections must verify appropriate behaviour of pension-fund management 
companies, such as crediting contributions to individual accounts, deducting 
commissions, advertising, affiliation and transfers, etc. 
 Most of these are ‘on-site’ activities, verifying supporting documents and are 
complementary with controls inside the supervision agency.  In some cases, inspectors 
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have to make decisions on site, but, generally, documents are later analysed inside the 
supervision agency: in Argentina around one third of supervisor’s time is spent on 
analysis within the agency.   
 There are a number of special difficulties relating to inspections and audits  
• The focus on controls within the pension funds means the diversity of subjects 
encountered is great.  The inspectors must therefore be well trained and their tasks 
precisely defined 
• As inspectors represent the agency when on site, personal deportment is also 
important 
• Although audit software can help to stratify samples improve information 
processing, inspection and audit is a very labour intensive activity 
• Interaction with other divisions of the supervision agency is crucial, since 
inspections or audits prompted by their activities will be important.  About 50-60 
per cent of time should be devoted to regular controls, and 40-50 per cent to 
unanticipated activities.  
 Inspections should be divided into programmes.  For each, the following needs 
to be clearly set out  
• objectives of the corresponding control activity 
• frequency of controls and whether regular or irregular 
• activities to achieve the objective 
• procedures, indicating routines and criteria for the activities 
• resources to be allocated to the programme  
• circumstances that prompt an action of control, isosfar as they can be described 
objectively  
• results and execution of disciplinary policy, for prevention, correction and 
deterrence  
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 The annual inspection plan consists of a comprehensive group of programmes.  
Each pension-fund company should be inspected at least annually under each 
programme.   
 The Argentine agency in 1994-95 followed an ‘integrated’ strategy: once the 
inspectors visited a company, they completed the whole set of inspections.  Since 1996, 
this strategy was changed, so that the controls would be less predictable to the 
companies and to guarantee the presence of the agency at the fund managers’ offices 
throughout the year.   
 A tentative list of possible inspection programs is given below, based on 
Argentine experience but generalised as much as possible. 
• Control of individual accounts aims to examine a sample of individual accounts of 
each fund, verifying that the information is consistent, particularly that credits are 
given and commissions deducted properly and on time 
• Control of information to members and beneficiaries should verify supporting 
documentation of the requirement to provide regular information 
• Control of accounting practices should check that the pension-fund company can 
support the financial information on assets etc. provided to the supervision agency  
• Control of affiliation verifies, for a sample of members, that affiliation forms have 
been completed correctly (e.g., no forms signed blank or incomplete). In special 
cases, the programme could include direct monitoring of the affiliation process 
• Control of documentation on investments and reserves, complementary to 
financial controls within the agency 
• Control of fund-management-company branches includes site visits to branches, 
and checks of the information provided to members and revisions to affiliation and 
transfer books 
• Complaints and claims procedures must be checked, and their implementation and 
verified.  Again, this is complementary regular checks inside the supervision agency 
on the accuracy of solutions to complaints  
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• Verification of payments to life-insurance companies is important when life 
insurers provide disability and survivorship pensions.  Again, inspection focuses on 
checking supporting documents 
 All of these programs should be completed at least once a year for each pension-
fund company, but repeated under special inspections as necessary.  These special 
inspections, however, should follow the same control procedures as regular audits.  
 
4.2.6 Evaluation of financial and operational performance 
 The financial performance of pension-fund companies can be evaluated using 
methods adapted from those used to assess the efficiency of banks and insurance 
companies.  Checking minimum-capital and reserve requirements is an important part 
of the financial-evaluation routine.  
It is also useful interesting to evaluate pension-fund companies operations.  Some 
funds may have few or no financial problems, but they may be inefficient.  This can be 
identified from the results of all control activities.  A database of such information is a 
useful input to developing performance criteria and evaluating operational results. 
 
4.3  Financial controls 
 The financial flows of contributions, investments and benefits in the new system 
need to be monitored.  These include 
• Collection of contributions and transfers between funds 
• Investment supervision, including information sources and information-technology 
systems 
• Asset-valuation procedures, particularly for instruments with no market price 
• Investment limits, if any, by type of instrument, risk-rating level, issuer, etc. 
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• Custodianship 
• Calculation of returns 
• Minimum guarantees 
These seven areas are investigated in turn.  
 
4.3.1  Collection 
 There are two basic models for the transfer of contributions from workers to 
pension funds: centralised and decentralised. The first is more common in countries 
where a ‘first pillar’ of pay-as-you-go, public pensions with universal coverage is 
maintained along with the funded ‘pillar’, such as Argentina and Uruguay.  
Alternatively, in the absence of a first pillar, a decentralised collection scheme is more 
reasonable, as in Chile, Colombia and Peru.  Table 5 summarises the basic arguments 
for the adoption of a centralised or decentralised collection system.4  Although many of 
them are not relevant here, the regulation and supervision of collection is central to this 
paper. 
                                            
4  For an extended discussion of these issues, see Rofman (1997) and Demarco and Rofman (1998).   
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Table 5.  Comparison of collection systems 
Criterion Centralised collection Decentralised collection 
Economies of scale High Overlapping structures 
Duplication of costs 
Efficiency Traditional systems  
can be inefficient 
New, technologically updated 
system can be more efficient 
Timing Lags possible Usually instantaneous 
Control mechanisms Simple Complex 
Cross controls Tax contributions None 
Incentives Fiscal Profits 
Policing power Absolute Indirect 
Costs Economies of scale 
BUT monopoly 
Profit motive 
BUT diseconomies of scale 
Financing State 
Problem of valuation if funds pay 
Pension fund 
 
 Figures 2 and 3 show the flow of funds in a multipillar and in a single-pillar 
pension system respectively.  In the second case, centralised collection makes the 
process unnecessarily longer, but in the first, there are close connections between public 
and private institutions.  Centralisation appears at least convenient.  
 The centralised approach also appears more appropriate from the regulatory 
point of view. With a single organisation collecting contributions, usually a government 
agency, regulation and supervision can be the same as those applied to other arms of 
government.  In some countries, such as Argentina, the tax-collection agency collects 
contributions.  In others, such as Mexico and Uruguay, it is the old social-security 
administration.  In the United Kingdom, contributions are collected by the contributions 
agency of the department of social security, but this has recently been merged with the 
tax-collection administration.  In both models, economies of scale can be reaped but 
further positive externalities derive from the possibility of cross-controls when tax 
administrations are used. 
 With decentralised collections, each pension-fund managing company tends to 
establish its own structure.  Supervision is therefore more complex.  A special 
procedure must be established and the task is multiplied by the number of management 
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companies.  In most cases, collection is organised through the existing banking system, 
but some managing companies may decide to collect the contributions directly.  In 
either case, clear regulation of responsibility for the safekeeping of contributions before 
they are credited to pension funds and proper supervision to ensure compliance are 
necessary. 
The supervision of collection is closely related to the transfer of contributions to 
individual accounts.  While the former will not be the exclusive competence of pension-
fund supervisors, the latter clearly forms part of supervisory financial and institutional 
controls.  If the collecting agency in not regulated by the pension-fund supervisory 
agency, close co-operation between the two agencies is vital for effective control.  In 
Argentina, this co-operation is based on two flows of information 
• The collection agency gives monthly information of movements into individual 
accounts, allowing the supervision agency to control affiliation and individual 
accounts as outlined above 
• The supervision agency informs the collection agency of irregularities detected 
through audit or affiliates’ complaints 
 Additional information can be derived from cross-controls of tax and social-
security contributions when collected by the same office. 
 A final collection issue, especially in a centralised system, is the design of a good 
identification system for affiliates.  This affects the timing of the collection and 
distribution of contributions, and the detection and solution of any problems.  It is 
important to have an identification system in place from the start, particularly where 
social-security or tax identification systems are inadequate.   
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Figure 2.  Flow of funds in a system with a public pillar 
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Figure 3.  Flow of funds with a single, funded private pillar 
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4.3.2 Reporting 
 Regular reporting is critical.  Reports must be filed with the supervision agency 
on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis (as in Argentina and Chile).  These reports 
should include full details of investment policies, portfolio composition and revenues 
and expenditures.  Reports from custodians (see below) and the stock exchange or 
financial institutions should also be collected.  Reports on the finances of managing 
companies is also necessary, especially where they have a role in guaranteeing 
minimum returns or are required to hold a minimum amount of capital. 
 
4.3.3 Asset valuation 
Although the majority of pension funds assets will be invested in instruments 
with a clear market value, a transparent valuation system is needed to ensure the fund 
is able to pay benefits.  
Most of the Latin-American systems have a valuation system based on daily 
prices. In some cases, such as Argentina, the supervision agency is responsible for 
calculating daily prices.  In others, such as Chile, each manager calculates values using 
rules determined by the supervision agency.  These methods have similar results, 
because they follow similar procedures 
• valuation is based on market prices 
• daily information is provided by pension funds (and in Argentina, this is 
cross-checked with information from financial markets 
• clear rules are established by the supervision agency to value of non-traded 
assets 
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In either scheme, the book value of funds is approximately equal to market 
value, and fund members own a number of shares in the fund.  Table 6 shows the 
diverse range of valuation methods used in OECD countries.   
 
Table 6.  Valuation bases in OECD countries 
Country Equities Bonds Loans Property 
 quoted unquoted high quality low quality   
Australia market market market market market market 
Austria mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Belgium market market repayment mkt/purchase outstanding market 
Canada adjusted market mkt/purchase amortised amortised amortised adjusted market
Denmark mkt/purchase mkt/purchase amortised amortised amortised mkt/purchase 
Finland adjusted market adjusted market amortised adjusted market amortised adjusted market
France mkt/purchase mkt/purchase amortised amortised mkt/purchase amortised 
Germany lowest ever lowest ever lowest ever lowest ever mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Greece lowest ever lowest ever mkt/purchase mkt/purchase lowest ever lowest ever 
Iceland market mkt/purchase market mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Ireland market market market market market market 
Italy mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Japan mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Luxembourg market market outstanding market market market 
Mexico adjusted market adjusted market market market market market 
Netherlands mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase market 
Norway mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Portugal market market amortised/mkt market market market 
Spain market mkt/purchase market market mkt/purchase market 
Sweden mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Switzerland adjusted market adjusted market amortised amortised market — 
Turkey lowest ever mkt/purchase lowest ever lowest ever mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
United Kingdom market adjusted market market market market market 
United States  market market amortised mkt/purchase mkt/purchase mkt/purchase 
Source: OECD (1996) 
Note: ‘mkt/purchase’ means the lower of the market or purchase price for quoted investments and lower of purchase price or 
written-down book value for unquoted.  Belgium: repayment value used for securities issued or guaranteed by the public sector; 
lower of market or purchase value applies to other high-quality bonds.  Finland: mortgages are amortised, other loans adjusted 
market value.  Netherlands: bonds and loans can also be valued on an amortised basis.   United States: data apply to New 
Jersey and Delaware.    
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4.3.4 Investment limits 
 The issue of portfolio restrictions on funds is controversial: they may force 
managers to choose sub-optimal risk-return combinations, but they can guarantee some 
level of conservatism in investment decisions and force diversification.  Limitations are 
usually set in several dimensions: by type of assets, by issuer, by risk category 
(established by the supervision agency or private rating agencies) and by potential 
conflicts of interests. 
 The first is most important and, in principle, the simplest to supervise.  
Maximum amounts or percentages of the fund are that can be invested in classes as 
government bonds, equities, certificate of deposit, corporate bonds, foreign assets etc. 
may be set.  Minimum levels, since they force funds to invest part of the portfolio in 
certain assets, are best avoided.  Bolivia and Uruguay force funds to invest the majority 
of their assets in government bonds.  No OECD country currently imposes such 
minima.5  To ensure that managers have a wide choice of investments, the sum of the 
maxima should exceed 100 per cent (probably as much as 200 per cent) of the total size 
of the fund.  Managers may then avoid one specific type of asset if they wish.   
Most controversial in this area are maximum limits for foreign assets.  These 
limits force fund managers to invest more than optimally in domestic instruments.  
However, existing limits in Latin America have not been binding.  For example, the 
maximum in Argentina is 17 per cent of funds, while actual investment is less that one 
per cent.  Similar results obtain in Chile. 
                                            
5  OECD (1996).   
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 Table 7 shows the structure of portfolios in Argentina, Chile and Peru in June 
1997 along with the legal maxima by type of instrument.  For some instruments, 
restrictions have been binding.6   
 Many OECD countries — Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden and Switzerland — also set these kinds of portfolio limits.  In other countries, 
such as Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, there are no quantitative restrictions.  However, pension funds are 
obliged to invest as a ‘prudent person’ would with his or her own money.  Data 
covering the period 1967-90 show a 1.8 percentage point higher annual rate of return on 
pension-fund investments in countries with prudent-person rules compared with those 
with quantitative limits.  More recently (1984-96), the gap has widened to 4.3 percentage 
points a year.7  However, Vittas (1998) argues that the prudent-person rule may be 
sufficient protection for defined-benefit plans, but that defined-contribution plans 
require greater protection.   
 
Table 7.  Pension-fund portfolios in Argentina, Chile and Peru, June 1997 
Assets  Argentina Chile Peru 
(% fund) Actual Maximum Actual Maximum Actual Maximum 
Public-sector bonds 49.3 50 37.7 35/50 11.5 40 
Private-sector bonds 4.8 28 3.8 30/50 16.2 35 
Certificate of deposit 17.8 28 8.4 30/50 33.6 50 
Equities 21.8 35 29.3 35/50 34.8 30 
Mortgages 0.4 28 17.0 35/50 0.5 40 
Others 5.9 — 3.8 — 3.4 — 
       
Total 100.0 169 100.0 165/250 100.0 195 
Source: SAFJP, Argentina; SAFP, Chile; SAFP, Peru 
                                            
6  Information refers to aggregate portfolios.  Restrictions do not necessarily require the aggregated 
amount to coincide with the legal upper limit.  Also, individual funds usually establish lower-than-legal 
upper limits of their own, to avoid incurring the costs of asset liquidation when changes in the portfolio 
are required.  Another reason for lower-than-legal limits in Argentina is that the supervisor values the 
funds, and, in exceptional cases, this may result in differences between official prices and those assumed 
by the pension-fund managers. 
7  OECD (1998), Table V.2.   
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Figure 4.  Pension-fund values and market indices, 1997 
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Source: SAFJP, Argentina 
 
Investment limits have been useful in gaining public confidence in the new 
systems.  They might also have prevented a more dramatic impact on pension funds 
from the ‘tequila effect’ of 1994 and the recent East-Asian crisis.  Figure 4 shows the 
evolution of different capital-market indicators in Argentina during 1997.  Pension 
funds proved much more stable than broader market indices. 
 The second type of limit (by issuer) is designed to avoid concentration of 
investments and the associated risk.  The third (limits by risk) are designed to avoid 
assets with poor risk ratings.  Finally, the fourth type of limit aims to avoid conflicts of 
interests between the fund and other activities of fund managers by prohibiting or 
limiting investment in assets issued by companies with strong economic relations with 
the managing company. 
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 These four types of limitations cause some difficulties in implementation and 
supervision. The creativity of financial markets can rapidly make irrelevant differences 
between pre-defined categories such as bond, equity, deposits etc., especially when 
different types of derivatives are used.  Supervisory agencies must be able to alter 
categorisations rapidly, for example, of a certificate of deposit in a bank with the return 
linked to the performance of a number of stocks, domestic and foreign.  
 Limits by issuer pose the definitional problem of defining issuers as either 
individual companies or economic groups.  If the goal is to force diversification, then 
limits should be established for the whole of economic groups, but it is not always clear 
which companies belong to them.  
 Limits by risk level are less problematic, but effective supervision of risk-rating 
agencies is essential.  
 The fourth limit, relating to conflicts of interest poses two problems.  The first, as 
outlined already, is in defining and identifying economic groups.  Secondly, not all 
investments in assets issued by a company belonging to the same economic group as 
the managing firm will create a conflict of interest: market mechanisms may generate 
fair prices. 
 
4.3.5 Custodianship 
 Custodian institutions, acting as a depository for assets and guaranteeing the 
integrity of the fund is a central part of the financial regulation of pension funds.  
Custodians should report to the supervisory agency with the same frequency as 
managers, and data from the two sources should be cross-checked.  Also, custodians 
should be informed of investment limits and be required to refuse any transaction that 
would violate these limits. 
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 In Argentina, banks may act as custodians if they are specially authorised by the 
central bank.  An institution regulated by the securities and exchange commission 
(CNV) may also act as custodian, but banks are predominant.  Five of the biggest banks 
have been chosen as custodians by 17 of the 18 pension funds.  Custodians and pension 
funds should not of course belong to the same economic group to avoid conflicts of 
interest. 
  
4.3.6  Calculating returns 
 Calculation of the returns of the fund will be a critical task of the supervisory 
agency when there are minimum or relative rate-of-return guarantees.  Clear regulation 
of methodology is necessary and calculations must be made at the supervision agency, 
either definitively (i.e., as the official calculation) or as a control (i.e., verifying the 
managers’ calculations.  Even in the absence of guarantees, a regulation defining the 
methodology for calculating returns should be specified to increase transparency and 
comparability between different funds. 
 
4.3.7 Applying guarantees 
 Several different types of guarantees of funded-pension benefits have been 
offered.   
First, the government can guarantee minimum retirement incomes.  No 
minimum return is required from the fund, and the supervisory agency does not need 
to implement guarantee procedures.  This is the approach adopted in Mexico.   
Secondly, other Latin-American countries, such as Argentina and Chile, set a 
minimum relative rate of return.  Each fund must generate a minimum return over 
certain period (usually 12 months) defined as a proportion of the average return 
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obtained by the industry.  The managing companies are responsible for compensating 
fund members if the return is insufficient.  The supervisory agency must implement a 
mechanism to calculate the minimum return, verify if a fund has fallen below it and 
oversee the compensation process.  A third approach offers a minimum rate-of-return 
guarantee, but this is underwritten by a guarantee fund financed by all the pension 
funds.  The guarantee fund operates as type of insurance scheme.  The supervisory 
agency should carefully monitor the investments of a guarantee fund to ensure that the 
necessary resources will be available as required. 
 
4.4 Membership and benefits 
 Initially, much of the work will be concentrated on contributors’ complaints, but 
as the scheme matures, supervision of benefits will become significant.  The main areas 
of work, which are discussed in turn, are 
• Membership procedures and transfer from one fund to another 
• Disclosure 
• Resolution of contributors’ and beneficiaries’ complaints 
• Definition and control of procedures to apply for benefits 
• Definition of technical bases for annuities calculations 
• Control of accuracy of benefits paid as annuities or programmed withdrawals 
• Procedures for disability qualification 
 
4.4.1 Membership procedures and transfers 
 Regulations should cover five different issues 
• formal documentation of the individual decision 
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• conditions for membership and transfer, and documents to support them 
• role of the sales force 
• responsibilities of funds and their sales forces in case of fraud or incorrect affiliation 
• an institution responsible for keeping a record of affiliates 
 The third and fourth issues are crucial to the transparency and cost of the system.  
For this reason, Argentina has recently changed affiliation and transfer rules.  While the 
previous system relied predominantly on promoters, the new system puts the emphasis 
on the fund-management companies’ branches.  Affiliates who want to transfer from 
one fund to another now have to fill out the required form in the branch office, where 
registration in an authorised book is required.  This system is thought to have three 
main advantages compared with the previous one 
• As the affiliation and transfer process relies less on promoters, regulations regarding 
the legal relationship between the sales force and pension funds can be more 
flexible, reducing costs 
• Pension-fund managers can reduce the number of promoters as they increase the 
number of branches.  Conditions for opening branches were also relaxed, permitting 
the common use of space and personnel with other activities, such as banks 
• The responsibility for fraud in affiliations or transfers now lies with the fund-
management company rather than the promoter.  In the previous system, the fund 
was only responsible when it could be proved the promoter acted on instructions of 
the fund or when the number of incorrect affiliations was large enough to suggest 
inadequate internal controls 
 Supervision of sales forces may consist either of detailed syllabuses for training 
programmes or just general guidelines.  Responsibility for training is usually assigned 
to pension funds, but certification is regulated to different degrees in different 
countries.  In Argentina, the supervision agency initially certified potential sales 
personnel on the result of a centralised examination.  As the system has matured, 
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certification is now left to the pension-fund managers, according to a procedure 
approved by the regulatory agency. 
 Whatever the definitions and model adopted, regular inspections will be 
necessary, of the following 
• Promoters’ training and certification 
• Affiliations or transfers by promoters: on-site examination of information given to 
potential members etc. 
• Audit of branches, again  examining information given out to potential members 
 Further validations are possible if a centralised system of affiliation is developed. 
If contributions are collected centrally, as in Argentina, this is a task of the collection 
agency, using data from the supervision, such as identifying numbers for promoters or 
the head of fund managers’ branches.   
 
4.4.2  Disclosure  
 Regular reporting to fund members must be a priority for system designers.  The 
new funded plans compete to offer their services.  Only if contributors have clear 
information on costs and returns of different funds will they be able to make educated 
choices and transfer to the best funds.  Competitive pressures will then reduce costs and 
increase efficiency. 
 Apart from the communications they choose to give their fund members, pension 
funds should be obliged to provide some basic information, such as 
• General information about the new funded or multipillar pension system 
• General information about the pension-fund management company, such as its 
partners, basic indicators of its financial situation, etc. 
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• Charges and costs of the fund compared with the system’s average 
• Returns of the fund compared with the system’s average 
• Individual members’ account flows and balance 
• Procedures to report irregularities and file complaints 
• Procedures to claim a pension benefit 
• Information about  the insurance market, especially annuities 
 Most supervisors require funds to send a periodical report to each contributor or 
beneficiary.  The fund manager could be required to prepare general information, or 
merely to distribute pamphlets from the supervision or other government agencies. 
 Regulations should specify the contents, design and frequency of information the 
funds send to their contributors and beneficiaries.  Standardised formats are 
recommended, particularly for financial information, to facilitate comparisons between 
funds and to prevent manipulation of information by the enterprises.   
 Most Latin-American countries, following the Chilean example, require that the 
funds send each member a periodical report of the evolution of the individual account.  
In Argentina, the frequency is no less than three times a year.  This provides the 
affiliate with precise information on the amount of contributions paid into the account, 
the commission deducted and the pension fund’s return.  In addition, funds could be 
required to give quantitative information on the system in general, such as average 
commissions, average returns, effective commission rate at the affiliate’s level of 
income, etc.  
 Periodical reports have also proved helpful in detecting fraudulent affiliation or 
transfer: in Argentina, a significant number of lawsuits arise because a worker receives 
a report from a fund he or she has not chosen.  In addition, in a centralised collection 
system, affiliates can verify the correct deposit of contributions by their employers, and 
the correct transfer of funds by the collection agency. 
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 It is also important to avoid giving excessively detailed information that might 
be helpful for a small number of members, but useless, or even negative, for the rest.  
Argentina has recently changed the design of the standardised presentation, 
informative chart, concentrating basic, simplified information on the first page.  This is 
designed for easy interpretation by non-specialists.  More detailed information is on 
other pages.  The old, detailed and new, simplified templates are shown in the Annexes.   
 Inspections should check that reports have been sent regularly to affiliates and 
that information is accurate.   
 Another interesting recent initiative in Argentina was the distribution by 
supervision agency of a booklet comparing the effective level of commissions at 
different income levels. The information was necessarily more limited than in 
individual reports, but many people saw for the first time an indication of the real cost 
of their fund compared with others at their own income level.  Many used this 
information to transfer to a less expensive fund.   
 Disclosure requirements in Europe vary enormously.8  The United Kingdom and 
Ireland have the most comprehensive rules.  Members of employer-based schemes must 
be told eligibility rules, calculation of contributions and the type and level of benefits.  
Trust deeds must be available and an annual report provided nine months after the 
year-end in Ireland and one year after in the United Kingdom.  In the report, trustees 
must account for collection of contributions, investment of assets, payment of benefits 
and provide an actuarial valuation of assets and liabilities.  Austria, Denmark, France9, 
Spain and Switzerland also have legal requirements to inform members.  In other 
countries, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
                                            
8  See Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (1995) and Laboul (1998), Table 20.   
9 Cardon (1992) analysed the accounts of French companies and found little information on the type of 
scheme, contributions, actuarial methods and assumptions or breakdown of annual costs.   
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Sweden, there is no legal requirement to inform members, and there is a risk that plan 
members do not have adequate information to assess the performance of their funds.   
 
4.4.3 Complaints 
 Complaints could be addressed in the first instance either to the fund-
management company or to the supervisory agency.  In either case, an initial 
opportunity for resolution should be offered to the fund.   
 In Argentina, pension funds receive complaints and deal with them in a 
standardised way determined by the supervision agency.  The agency is informed of the 
result, and assesses whether the proposed solution is appropriate.  In cases of conflict or 
when the solution does not appear appropriate, the supervisory agency can prescribe 
solutions.  The agency also determines the final responsibilities of the fund or its 
employees and analyses the outcome of law-suits. 
 
4.4.4 Procedures to apply for benefits 
 Standardised procedures, forms and supporting documentation for claiming 
benefits should be set up.  An important consideration in multipillar regimes is the co-
ordination between the procedures and responsibilities the fund and the public social-
security agency. 
 Payment of benefits from different pillars may be separated or unified.  The latter 
is recommended because it avoids unnecessary duplication of procedures.  The 
following questions must be answered 
• will beneficiaries apply to the fund, with the latter acting as intermediary between 
them and the public social-security agency? 
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• will eligibility be verified by the fund or by the public social-security agency?  
• will unified benefit payments be split if the public social-security agency does not 
pay on time? 
 Unifying procedures and eligibility criteria is a complex task: in Argentina, it 
took almost two years. 
 
4.4.5 Life assurance and annuities: technical issues 
 Insurance against disability or death before retirement (‘life insurance’) and the 
provision of annuities for retirement income (‘longevity insurance’) coverage are central 
parts of the pension system.  In some countries, these insurance issues are dealt with by 
pension companies, along with the accumulation of contributions and investment 
returns.  In others, insurance issues are dealt with separately.  This has the advantage of 
allowing separate evaluation of pension-fund administration and the insurance 
companies’ coverage of personal risks.   
 An important regulatory issue is the relative competencies of the pension-fund 
supervision and the insurance supervision agencies, and ensuring co-ordination 
between the two by one of a number of means  
• Common dependence of both agencies on a co-ordination agency or committee 
• Having the pension-fund agency also supervise retirement-insurance companies  
• Separating supervision of insurance companies from that of their products, such as 
annuities 
 We recommend the last two approaches since the first may be excessively 
bureaucratic, reducing both agencies’ freedom of manoeuvre.  The third has been the 
most common, as a means of accommodating existing insurance agencies in the new 
regime.  The second has not been adopted in Latin America, although it would be 
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feasible and convenient where these companies are prohibited from offering other 
insurance products. 
 Argentina adopted the third approach: the pension-fund supervision agency 
controls life-insurance and annuity contracts, but the companies themselves are 
regulated by the existing insurance supervision agency.  The two agencies have 
subscribed to a co-operation agreement, which governs exchange of information and 
allows the pension agency to require the insurance agency to inspect a particular 
insurance company.    
 The key issue in regulating insurance contracts is specifying the technical, 
actuarial bases on which calculations are made.  
 
4.4.6 Accuracy of benefit payments 
Most Latin-American private pension plans allow pension members either to 
withdraw their whole fund and purchase an annuity, or to follow a programme of 
‘scheduled withdrawals’ from the fund.  In the first case, a retirement-insurance 
company will be involved, but in the second, the individual account at the pension fund 
remains open.  Benefits could therefore be supervised separately — by different 
agencies with different regulatory criteria — depending on the withdrawal route taken.  
The risk is that the choice of annuity versus scheduled withdrawal could be affected by 
regulatory asymmetries rather than simply by their different intrinsic economic 
characteristics.  
 The three options for co-ordination between insurance and pension-fund 
supervision apply here.  A fourth approach would be to eliminate the scheduled-
withdrawal option and force people to choose annuities.  This is not recommended, 
because it involves a major restriction of choice for the individual pension member.   
 45
4.4.7  Disability qualification10 
 In some countries disability qualification remains the responsibility of the pre-
existing state social-security agency.  At the other extreme, responsibility can be passed 
to pension funds or insurance companies.  The first is risky when existing institutions 
have been discredited, or proved to be inefficient and lacking transparency.  The second 
lacks the necessary objectivity for a fair disability-insurance regime.    
 In Chile and Argentina, disability qualification is in the hands of special ‘medical 
commissions’, which are autonomous to other areas of the system, although in 
Argentina, they are co-ordinated by the pension-fund supervision agency.  To 
guarantee the necessary objectivity, clear rules for disability qualification must be 
established.   
 
4.5  Information 
 An essential part of the role of the supervisory agency is the collection and 
dissemination of information on the new funded-pension sector, probably by a statistics 
and research division.  Data should include institutional arrangements of pension fund 
managers, membership, compliance, benefits, fees, revenues, fund investments, returns, 
performance of managing companies, etc.  In addition, economic information related to 
the pension system should be collected, such as labour-market statistics, social security, 
capital markets, public finances, internal and external debt.  Finally, information on 
domestic and foreign legislation should be gathered.   
 Timely dissemination as well as collection of these data is important, since they 
form an important input for independent researchers and analysts.  This is a vital part 
                                            
10  See Grushka and Demarco (1998) for a detailed discussion of disability pensions.   
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of ensuring that the new pension system is transparent.  The data are, of course, useful 
internally as an input to the regulatory divisions of the supervisory agency additional 
to regular inspections and audits.  Finally, the supervision agency will also want to 
carry out research on the evolution of the new pension system and its prospects in the 
medium term.   
 A regular statistical report, widely distributed, with basic data on membership, 
fees, revenue, investment, returns, etc. is a crucial output.  Press releases with general 
information and information brochures for members, covering fund portfolios and 
returns, should be issued regularly.   
 
4.6  Legal issues 
4.6.1 Fines and penalties 
 The results of inspections, audits and other controls can be divided into three 
categories: first, ‘all clear’; secondly, some revisions required which do not constitute 
errors; and, thirdly, irregularities or errors.  A database of these results should be built, 
which is particularly helpful in ensuring that penalties and fines are levied on fairly, 
equitably and objectively.  A pre-determined scale for fines is useful for consistency.   
4.6.2  The supervision agency and the courts  
 Some irregularities might exceed the competence of the pension-fund agency.  In 
these cases, which should be clearly established in the law, the agency would file the 
corresponding legal complaints.  Examples of such cases include fraud, attempts to 
force individual choice, forgeries, etc. 
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4.6.3 Regulations 
 The agency responsible for drafting regulations is often separate from the 
supervision agency, (see section 3.1 above).  But in practice, the supervision agency 
must design its own regulations, at the covering procedures and controls.  Legal 
professionals within the supervision should assist in this process. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 The debate over regulation of mandatory funded pension systems is far from 
closed.  The experience of the small number of countries that have recently 
implemented funded systems is useful, but these models may not be generally 
applicable.  The degree of professional expertise, the transparency and the 
independence of regulators and supervisors is essential to the success of the pension 
system.  Starting from first principles, it is useful to reprise the basic arguments for 
special regulation of pension funds against broader institutional arrangements.  
The widespread belief in reforming countries that inefficient and ineffectual 
regulation and supervision was at least partly responsible for past failures suggests that 
a new agency would be best placed to regulate funds effectively and build confidence in 
the new system.    
 We have argued that financial and organisational autonomy is most likely to lead 
to effective supervision and that salaries must be competitive with the private sector to 
recruit sufficient qualified personnel and to limit the risk of corruption.   
 We divided the substantive work of the supervisory agency into four areas: 
regulating institutional structures, finances, membership and benefits of funds.  Two 
further areas were also discussed.  First, the collection and distribution of contributions 
between funds might be part of the supervision agencies’ tasks.  Secondly, the 
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qualification for disability benefits was often one of the least satisfactory parts of pre-
reform pension systems.  We recommend that clear qualification rules be defined, that 
new, independent institutions are established to implement them and that these 
institutions are accountable to the pension-fund supervisory agency, where 
responsibility for disability pensions is transferred to the private sector.   
 Finally, concrete means of co-ordination and collaboration with other agencies 
must be established.  These might take the form of formal agreements to exchange 
information, request inspections or participate in joint inspections. 
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Annex 1.  Standardised report form: old model  
VARIACION DE LA CUOTA
CUENTA DE CAPITALIZACION INDIVIDUAL
ESTADO CUATRIMESTRAL
LOGO AFJP PERIODODD/MM/AA - DD/MM/AA
APELLIDO Y NOMBRES:
DOMICILIO:
D.N.I./L.E./L.C.:
C.U.I.L./C.U.I.T.:
SALDO DEL ESTADO ANTERIOR SALDO EN CUOTAS VALOR DE LA CUOTA SALDO EN PESOS
AL: DD/MM/AA ______________ _______________ ______________
INFORME DE LOS PAGOS EFECTUADOS EN EL PERIODO MONTO EN VALOR DE MONTO EN SALDO EN
PESOS LA CUOTA CUOTAS CUOTAS
APORTES OBLIGATORIOS PAGADOS EN EL CUATRIMESTRE:
REMUNERACION DEVENGADA MM/AA PAGADA DD/MM/AA
REMUNERACION DEVENGADA MM/AA PAGADA DD/MM/AA
REMUNERACION DEVENGADA MM/AA PAGADA DD/MM/AA
REMUNERACION DEVENGADA MM/AA PAGADA DD/MM/AA
IMPOSICIONES VOLUNTARIAS - DEPOSITOS CONVENIDOS:
CONCEPTO (I.V. o D.C.) PAGADA EL DD/MM/AA
CONCEPTO (I.V. o D.C.) PAGADA EL DD/MM/AA
CONCEPTO (I.V. o D.C.) PAGADA EL DD/MM/AA
CONCEPTO (I.V. o D.C.) PAGADA EL DD/MM/AA
COMISIONES COBRADAS EN EL CUATRIMESTRE:
COMISIONES FIJAS
POR APORTES OBLIGATORIOS
POR IMPOSICIONES VOLUNTARIAS-DEPOSITOS CONVENIDOS
OTRAS
COMISIONES PORCENTUALES
POR APORTES OBLIGATORIOS - COSTO ADMINISTRACION
POR APORTES OBLIGATORIOS - COSTO DEL SEGURO
POR IMPOSICIONES VOLUNTARIAS - DEPOSITOS CONVENIDOS
OTRAS
BONIFICACIONES APLICADAS (Según detalle)
OTROS DEBITOS Y CREDITOS (Según detalle)
SALDO INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATORIO: CUOTAS: VALOR DE LA CUOTA: SALDO EN PESOS:
SALDO INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARIO: CUOTAS: VALOR DE LA CUOTA: SALDO EN PESOS:
SALDO DE LA CUENTA DE CAPITALIZACION INDIVIDUAL: CUOTAS: SALDO EN PESOS:
INFORMACION SOBRE SU AHORRO PREVISIONAL
CUATRIMESTRE MES 1 MES 2 MES 3 MES 4
CUATRIMESTRE MES 1 MES 2 MES 3 MES 4
RENTABILIDAD DEL
FONDO DE JUBILACIONES
Y PENSIONES
RENTABILIDAD
PROMEDIO DEL
SISTEMA
COMISION
PROMEDIO DEL
SISTEMA
SECTOR LIBRE
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Annex 2.  Standardised report form: new model 
CUENTA DE CAPITALIZACION INDIVIDUAL
   "LOGO AFJP" ESTADO CUATRIMESTRAL
        RESUMEN
   Período DD-MM-AAAA al DD-MM-AAAA Hoja Nº 1 de
<Titular/Beneficiario> CUIL/CUIT:
<Domicilio> DNI/LE/LC:
<Código Postal/Localidad> Cuenta Nº:
Saldo de su Cuenta al : DD-MM-AAAA $           0,00
Aportes Obligatorios Ingresados en el cuatrimestre $           0,00
Incluye todos los aportes obligatorios ingresados en el período
Aportes voluntarios o depósitos convenidos $           0,00
Ingresados voluntariamente por Ud., su empleador o tercero
Saldo de Traspaso $           0,00
Ingresado a esta AFJP o remitido a otra AFJP si Ud. se cambió de administradora
Integración de Capitales (sólo en caso de fallecimiento o invalidez) $           0,00
Previsionales o de riesgos del trabajo, en caso de corresponder
Prestaciones (sólo para beneficiarios de prestaciones) $           0,00
Egresos por pago de jubilación, retiro definitivo de invalidez o pensión por fallecimiento
Comisiones Cobradas $           0,00
De acuerdo con el Régimen de Comisiones vigentes
Bonificación por permanencia $           0,00
Rebaja sobre las comisiones cobradas de acuerdo con el Régimen de Bonificaciones vigentes
Otros Conceptos $           0,00
Incorporados o deducidos de su cuenta
Rendimiento del período $           0,00
Obtenido por la inversión de sus fondos
Saldo de su Cuenta al : DD-MM-AAAA $           0,00
Nota: Se acompaña información IMPORTANTE y el Estado Cuatrimestral Detallado 
